Abstract. US policy on world resources and population underwent a drastic shift between the 1970s and 1980s. Underlying this shift were deep and persistent divisions among social scientists and policy scientists who are students of the global resource scarcity hypothesis. This article consists of a brief review of the history of the debate between those who believe that resources are becoming increasingly scarce and those who do not. Major focuses include the ambiguities of scarcity measures, and economic literature such as The Limits to Growth, Global 2000, the critique of Julian Simon, and The Resourceful Earth.
Introduction
The election of President Reagan in 1980 caused a near-180 degree shift in the direction of US policy on the world population -resource scarcity question (Finkle and Crane, 1985) , Whereas the conventional wisdom of the 1970s held that there were limits to growth, the view of the current US administration is that, if these exist, they are too far removed to merit concern. The US policy statement at the 1984 International Conference on Population in Mexico City dismissed concern over global scarcity of natural resources as a product of 'anti-intellectualism'.
Not surprisingly, the abrupt shift in policy was underlain by deep divisions among social and policy scientists who are students of the scarcity hypothesis. This article, which briefly reviews the history of this debate, can be seen as background to MacKellar and Vining (1987) . That monograph, prepared for the Committee on Population of the US National Research Council (NRC), was one of seventeen background papers to Population Growth and Economic Development: Policy Questions (US National Research Council, 1986) . The NRC study was commissioned by the US Agency for International Development (AID) to inform a reevaluation of the role of the agency in funding family planning activities in lessdeveloped countries (LDCs); this reevaluation, in turn, was undertaken in response to Administration hostility to AID involvement in such activities.
The measurement of natural resource scarcity
Economic scarcity exists when the opportunity cost of obtaining a resource is high (Fisher, 1979, page 5) . Among the common price indices of economic scarcity are unit extraction cost, relative resource price, marginal discovery cost, and in situ scarcity rent (for example, timber stumpage fees). The last two measures are usually either unobservable or irrelevant to the resource in question, so the first two indices have dominated the scarcity debate. In addition, a variety of quantity measures-reserves-to-production ratios, consumption per capita, and so on-have been employed.
No single scarcity measure is unambiguous (Brown and Field, 1979; MacKellar and Vining, 1988) . To give only a few examples, the relative price of a resource is biased if it reflects monopoly rents (oil), price controls (natural gas in the USA), or subsidies (groundwater in the US Southwest). Few resource prices adequately reflect the costs of environmental degradation arising from consumption of the resource; for example, oil and natural gas prices do not reflect the damage which may arise from the increasing concentration of atmospheric carbon dioxide. Real resource price is also of limited relevance because many precious resources (for instance, the atmosphere and most species) do not have prices. Establishing property rights to such resources is so difficult that conventional markets do not exist. Indeed, there is consensus that it is such resources which, as in Hardin's (1968) "tragedy of the commons" argument, are most likely to be misallocated.
Unit extraction cost and all physical scarcity indices are, if anything, even worse scarcity measures because they fail to capture the interplay between supply and demand which is at the heart of economic scarcity. Thus, the common-reserves index ignores the exploration, conservation, and substitution responses which are elicited by rising resource prices. Technical progress can cause unit extraction cost to fall even as the resource is exhausted (consider the near-extermination of certain whale species or the clearing of Eastern US forests in the 19th century).
The literature
The resource scarcity field is immense, but we are concerned, first, with contributions from the social sciences and policy sciences, and, second, with the relatively small body of such work whose focus is extremely broad. If one material, say wood, is becoming scarce relative to other materials, such as metals and plastics, then there are possibilities for substitution. If, by contrast, we are entering an age of generalized scarcity, when virtually all primary goods become more scarce relative to manufactured goods and labor, then an emergency exists. We are also interested in global scarcity as opposed to localized scarcity, because in the latter case there are possibilities for trade. Last, we are especially concerned with research in which empirical trends in scarcity measures have been examined.
Most research on resource scarcity has, not surprisingly, been done by economists. The central study of long-term resource scarcity trends remains that of Barnett and Morse (1963) , who reached the favorable conclusion that real unit extraction costs fell in most US resource sectors between 1870 and 1957 (an exception was the forestry sector). They also found a downward trend in real market prices. However, this landmark study failed to consider environmental costs and the increasing energy intensity of capital equipment. Updates of the study with more recent data points have, furthermore, produced inconsistent results. Barnett (1979) updated the original study and reaffirmed its findings, and [see also and Smith (1981) , the latter a rebuttal] found a continuing fall in extraction costs. On the other hand, Smith (1978, pages 160-166) looked at relative prices and concluded that no single, stable model supported the BarnettMorse result. Nordhaus (1974) found that the market prices of eleven minerals, including coal and crude petroleum, fell relative to the hourly wage in manufacturing between 1900 and 1970 . Slade (1982 , however, found empirical support for the hypothesis that relative prices of many resources followed a U-shaped path between 1870 and 1978. The suggested explanation for this is that during the initial decades of this period, falling unit extraction costs compensated for the exponentially rising scarcity rents which accrue to resource owners. In recent decades, by contrast, the growing scarcity rent component has caused real resource prices to rise. Slade's results have not been universally accepted or confirmed. Methodological criticisms have weakened the conclusion she reached in the case of copper (Mueller and Gorin, 1985) . Halvorsen and Smith (1984) concluded that economic scarcity, and, in particular, scarcity rent, has been decreasing in the Canadian mining industry. In a survey of real prices and unit extraction costs of both renewable and nonrenewable resources, Hall and Hall (1984) reached mixed conclusions. The hypothesis of growing scarcity was strongly supported for the energy and forestry sectors; in other sectors, however, scarcity trends were either favorable or ambiguous.
Working mainly in an economic vein, we have, like Hall and Hall (1984) , arrived at mixed conclusions (MacKellar and Vining, 1987) . We examined, for a spectrum of resources, postwar trends in every broadly available scarcity indicator. Conclusions relating to cereal grains were quite optimistic; those relating to crude oil, wood products, fish, and species were rather pessimistic.
The scarcity debate as the public knows it today began not among economists, but rather with the publication in 1972 of The Limits to Growth (Meadows et al, 1974) . Working with a computer model, Meadows et al concluded that without a virtual redefinition of personal and societal goals, the world was likely to undergo ecological collapse in the 21st century (page 24). The influence of the study on the public was prodigious. 'Earth Day' consciousness was ascendant, there was strong demand for cleaning up air and water, and, shortly after the study appeared, the prices of both oil and grain skyrocketed.
In fact, The Limits to Growth was a weak study on many grounds [a collection of critical essays is provided in Cole et al (1973) ; the response of economists is typified by Beckerman (1972) ]. The computer model contained representations not only of engineering and economic processes, but of more complex demographic, geophysical, and biological processes as well (Meadows et al, 1974, figure 26, pages 102-103) . Because the exercise was so ambitious, many critical relations in the model could not be estimated from statistical time-series, but were obtained by simple guesstimation. Model results were shown to be highly sensitive to the generally pessimistic parameter estimates and the exogenous assumptions employed (Cole and Curnow, 1973) . A failing particularly obnoxious to economists was the absence of a price system; in the metaphor of Peterson and Fisher (1977, page 706) , the world was assumed simply to crash into the wall of resource depletion without any price signals to choke off demand and stimulate the search for substitutes. Having assumed finite resources and exponentially growing demand, the authors of The Limits simply proved their assumptions. The Limits team subsequently protested that their purpose was merely to illustrate, for didactic purposes, one of many possible scenarios, but this further lowered the academic credibility of the study.
Limits set off a debate, which may fairly be termed acerbic, among four camps: we choose to call them ecologists, economists, exemptionalists, and debunkers (some partisans, of course, have worn several hats). The first group, whose most prolific member was Paul Ehrlich (for example, 1981a and 1981b), argued that a critical point had been reached, one at which the adoption of a 'soft' approach to the pursuit of happiness was imperative. At its extreme, this approach is pithily summed up in the title of a book by the also-prolific sociologist and ecological activist Ted Trainer: Abandon Affluence! (Trainer, 1985) . Lester Brown (for example, Brown et al, 1985) , an agricultural economist by training, may fairly be classified as an ecologist in outlook. Through the Worldwatch Institute, a Washington think tank which he founded, Brown has overseen the production of dozens of monographs positing crises of resource supply and environmental degradation. Tending to stand to the left of center politically, some ecologists [among them US presidential candidate Barry Commoner; for instance, see Commoner (1974) ] appear to believe that the modern capitalist system is institutionally biased towards overexploitation of natural resources and environmental degradation. In this, they share common ground with radical political economists (Gowdy, 1981; 1984) .
A few economists such as Boulding (1984) , Daly (1977) , Georgescu-Roegen (1971), and Hamrin (1983) have joined forces with the ecologists, so it is not misleading to identify the emergence of a 'neophysiocratic' substratum within the discipline. Traditional economists, whose work is exemplified by Beckerman (1972), , , Kneese (1976) , and Nordhaus (1974) , have appealed, predictably, to the neoclassical price mechanism as a source of resolution. Most current resource and environmental economics textbooks (such as Teitenberg, 1984) hew fairly closely to the neoclassical line.
The better-publicized response to the ecologists has come, however, from the exemptionalists. 'Exemptionalism' is the term proposed by Catton and Dunlap (1980; Dunlap, 1983a; 1983b) to describe the belief that man's special abilities and role in the universe exempt him from ecological constraints. Technical progress has, of course, figured in the scarcity debate since the time of Malthus, but the new exemptionalism, as typified in the many contributions of Julian Simon (198Id; see also Kahn et al, 1976; Malenbaum, 1975) , is, nonetheless, striking for its aggressive optimism.
The fervor of Simon, who does not hold resources to be in any meaningful sense finite (1981d, pages 42-50) , is rooted in a deep belief that human beings are a miracle to be celebrated; their capacity for invention makes them the solution, not the problem (pages 9-11 and 188-222, especially pages 221-222). He is dismayed at the official sanction given, through the funding process, to the antigrowth and, in Simon's final analysis, antihuman views of the Zero Population Growth (ZPG) movement (pages 291-348; Simon, 1985) and its Malthusian ilk. Simon's work has obtained an enthusiastic following among Reagan Administration policymakers.
Most major participants in the debate have, at one time or another, assumed the role of statistical debunker; however, none has been more industrious than Simon. His critique of Ehrlich, Brown, and Global 2000 (US Department of State and US Council on Environmental Quality, 1980; see discussion below) rests on the primacy of extensive time-series evidence (Simon, 1981c, pages 7-19; Simon and Kahn, 1984b, page 27) : if it cannot be shown from a long time-series that an unambiguous deterioration has occurred, then the argument is over. Anecdotal evidence and 'back of the envelope' estimates, which tend to attain an unwarranted aura of veracity in the citation process, are to be rejected (Simon, , pages 1431 (Simon, -1432 Simon and Wildavsky, 1984, pages 172-179) . In general, those whose statistical procedures he has challenged have been more than willing to reply, point for point, lawyer-fashion [for example, Brown (1982); Gillman (1981) , and Simon (1981b) in rejoinder; Ehrlich (1981a) in reply to Simon (1981a); Wattenberg (1982) for a conversational debate between Simon and biologist Garrett Hardin].
The major US government contribution to the scarcity debate is the justmentioned Global 2000 study, undertaken at the behest of President Carter. To construct a comprehensive and systematically consistent baseline scenario, the directors of the study attempted to forge a 'soft link' between government experts in economics, agriculture, climate, energy, and so on (US Department of State and US Council on Environmental Quality, 1980, pages 453-499) . In this way, analytical input was maximized while some of the power of a fully linked simulation analysis was preserved. Global 2000 concluded that without concerted policy action, most of the people of the world would enter the next century more deprived of goods and amenities than they were in 1980. This set off a storm of protest from critics in the optimistic camp (Kahn and Schneider, 1981; Simon, 1981b; 1981c; Simon and Kahn, 1984a) ; they drew attention to the failure of Global 2000 to adduce timeseries evidence supporting its gloomy view, the biases of the major investigators, and the methodological weaknesses inherent in the soft-linked computer-model approach.
Global 2000, with official imprimatur, represented something of a gauntlet cast down by the ecologist camp. The challenge was taken up by Simon and Kahn (1984a) , who assembled a much more optimistic set of papers entitled, appropriately, The Resourceful Earth. The introduction to this volume is an especially useful summary of the Simon critique. A serious charge therein is that public agency analysis in the scarcity area has been systematically erroneous. As Simon and Kahn (1984a, page 29) put it:
"Too often the agency making the assessment has an axe to grind that derives from its perceived mission and which biases its forecasts. Furthermore, staffproduced government reports must pass through reviews at various stages up the chain of command, and the final conclusions of the staff report, therefore, are likely to emphasize conventional views and to reduce the range of opinion expressed .... Our aim here is not to denigrate the efforts of capable, hardworking, and dedicated civil servants, or to suggest that all (or even most) bureaucratic review is bad. Rather our aim is to point out that internally prepared assessments can and do suffer scientifically because of organizational forces that prevail in government whatever the administration." Institutional biases, according to the Simon-Kahn analysis, are made more dangerous by heavy reliance on forecasts based on computer models (Simon and Kahn, 1984a, pages 33-39) . In rejecting the appropriateness of model-based approaches to extremely long-term complex phenomena, Simon and Kahn are in good company (Arthur and McNicoll, 1975; Ayres, 1984) . The influences of the very phenomena which are likely to be of greatest importance in the long runtechnical progress and demographic change, for instance-are virtually impossible to isolate in statistical analysis of time-series data. This is because in the short run they are 'weak signals'; therefore, they cannot be detected in time-series of the length generally analyzed. Either they are drowned out by 'strong signals' in the time-series, like the income -consumption relationship, or they are lost in the 'noise' emanating from collinearity between independent variables (Shourie, 1972) . Also important to consider in making long-term projections, and typically underappreciated in model-based approaches, are social and institutional changes, which are almost impossible to quantify [for the behavioral adaptations to persistent nutritional stress, see Geertz (1970) ; the adaptation of African farming systems to population stress is discussed by Binswanger and Pingali (1984) ]. In the limiting case, biological evolution is a critical long-run response [see Stini (1975) for the genetic response to nutritional stress].
The essays in The Resourceful Earth, articles by experts on various resources, represent a culmination of sorts for the analytical approach championed by Simon. There is little attempt at general equilibrium analysis; rather, the analytical conclusion of each chapter is allowed to stand on its own. A premium is placed on compilation of time-series evidence, especially price data, and, where possible, simple extrapolation is the preferred method of forecasting. Emphasis on prices and extrapolation of longterm trends are both roundly attacked in Trainer's (1988) criticism of the volume.
Conclusion
There is no sign that the natural resource scarcity debate is cooling down. Old conflicts continue to simmer, and the debate is also shifting into new and poorly understood areas-species loss, ozone-layer depletion, and accumulation of atmospheric carbon dioxide, for example. Increasing attention is being paid to complex issues of environmental degradation, as opposed to simple resource exhaustion per se. Despite careful theoretical reasoning, compilation of data, and hypothesis testing in this area, social scientists and policy scientists have failed, so far, to arrive at a consensus view.
